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Abstract. Embedded in the overall concept of integral risk
management, mitigating mountain hazards is pillared by land
use regulations, risk transfer, and information. In this paper
aspects on legislation related to natural hazards in Austria
are summarised, with a particular focus on spatial planning
activities and hazard mapping, and possible adaptations fo-
cussing on enhanced resilience are outlined. Furthermore,
the system of risk transfer is discussed, highlighting the
importance of creating incentives for risk-aware behaviour,
above all with respect to individual precaution and insurance
solutions. Therefore, the issue of creating awareness through
information is essential, which is presented subsequently.
The study results in recommendations of how administra-
tive units on different federal and local levels could increase
the enforcement of regulations related to the minimisation
of natural hazard risk. Moreover, the nexus to risk trans-
fer mechanisms is provided, focusing on the current com-
pensation system in Austria and some possible adjustments
in order to provide economic incentives for (private) invest-
ments in mitigation measures, i.e. local structural protection.
These incentives should be supported by delivering informa-
tion on hazard and risk target-oriented to any stakeholder in-
volved. Therefore, coping strategies have to be adjusted and
the interaction between prevention and precaution has to be
highlighted. The paper closes with recommendations of how
these efforts could be achieved, with a particular focus on the
situation in the Republic of Austria.
1 Introduction
In Austria, strategies to prevent or to reduce the effects
of natural hazards in areas of settlements and economic
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activities trace back in the mediaeval times; ofﬁcial author-
ities were only founded in 1884 (L¨ anger, 2003) based on a
ﬁrst legal regulation (¨ Osterreichisch-Ungarische Monarchie,
1884). In the second half of the 19th and the early 20th cen-
tury protection against natural hazards was mainly organised
by implementing permanent measures in the upper parts of
thecatchmentstoretainsolidsfromerosionandintherelease
areas of avalanches. These measures were supplemented by
silvicultural efforts to afforest high altitudes. Since the 1950s
such conventional mitigation concepts – which aimed at de-
creasing both, the intensity and the frequency of events –
wereincreasinglycomplementedbymoresophisticatedtech-
nical mitigation measures. Until the 1970s, mitigation con-
cepts mainly aimed at the deﬂection of hazard processes into
areas not used for settlements.
In the Republic of Austria conventional mitigation of natu-
ral hazards institutionally originates from the 1890s when the
French system of forest-technical torrent and avalanche con-
trol was adopted. Watershed management measures, forest-
biological and soil bio-engineering measures as well as tech-
nical measures (construction material: timber and stone ma-
sonry) had been implemented. Thus, conventional mitigation
concepts only consider technical structures within the catch-
ment, along the channel system or track and in the deposi-
tion area. According to the approach of disposition manage-
ment (reducing the probability of occurrence of natural haz-
ards) and event management (interfering the transport pro-
cess of the hazard itself), a wide range of technical measures
is applicable.
Conventional technical measures against mountain haz-
ards, such as deﬂection and retention walls as well as tor-
rential barriers, are not only very cost-intensive in construc-
tion, moreover, because of a limited lifetime and therefore an
increasing complexity of maintenance in high-mountain re-
gions, the feasibility of technical structures is restricted due
toa scarceness ofﬁnancialresources provided byresponsible
authorities. If maintenance is neglected mitigation measures
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will become ineffective and can even increase the catas-
trophic potential of natural hazards. Since conventional tech-
nical measures do neither guarantee reliability nor complete
safety, a residual risk of damage to buildings, infrastructure
and harm to people remains.
Experiences from last years suggested that values at
risk and spatial planning should be increasingly considered
within the framework of natural hazard risk reduction (Fuchs
et al., 2005; Zischg et al., 2005a, b; Kano-nier, 2006; Keiler
et al., 2006). To meet this goal, integral risk management
strategies seem to be a valuable instrument to reduce the sus-
ceptibility of buildings and infrastructure to natural hazards
and to develop strategies for a strengthened resistance (Fuchs
et al., 2007a), above all by means of local protection mea-
sures.
Besidesconventionaltechnicalmitigationmeasures, struc-
tural precaution is achieved by an adapted construction de-
sign and the appropriate use of an object. Structural precau-
tion is the main application domain for local structural mea-
sures, since the individual vulnerability of buildings can be
fundamentally decreased by strengthening e.g. brick walls
with reinforced concrete components, and/or the adopted in-
terior design of the different rooms according to occupancy
time and hazard potential (Holub and H¨ ubl, 2008).
The principles of planning and implementation of local
structural measures to reduce vulnerability against natural
hazards are neither highly sophisticated nor very innovative
(Fuchs, 2009). However, the overall framework of dealing
withmountainhazardsinAustriadoesnotexplicitlytakeinto
account such principles.
Firstly, the legislation related to natural hazards is diverse
due to the federal structure of the Republic of Austria. Sev-
eral articles at federal level are supplemented by various reg-
ulations on the level of the federal states (L¨ ander level) and
even below at community level, in particular with respect to
land use planning. Secondly, different strategies to mitigate
and thus compensate the effects of mountain hazards exist
in Austria. These strategies, above all the governmental dis-
aster fund and private insurance solutions, are neither par-
ticularly coordinated with respect to risk minimisation nor
do they create considerable incentives for individuals to pre-
vent losses. Thirdly, risk awareness is not very prevalent
throughout the country due to an information deﬁcit related
to the general occurrence of mountain hazards and mitigation
strategies and concepts to avoid losses.
In this paper aspects on legislation related to natural haz-
ards in Austria are summarised, with a particular focus on
spatial planning activities and hazard mapping, and possible
adaptations focussing on enhanced resilience are outlined.
Furthermore, the system of risk transfer is discussed, high-
lighting the importance of creating incentives for risk-aware
behaviour, aboveallwithrespecttoindividualprecautionand
insurance solutions. Therefore, the issue of creating aware-
nessthroughinformationis essential, whichispresentedsub-
sequently.
2 Legislation
In the Austrian legislation, multiple regulations with respect
to natural hazards exist (Fig. 1). However, no uniform and
consistent text of law with respect to the protection from the
effects arising from natural hazards is given. In contrast, im-
plications governed by public law are large in number and
multifaceted, and include articles in the Austrian Forest Act,
the Austrian Hydrography Act and the Disaster Fund Act at
federal level as well as laws regulating spatial planning and
land use planning on the L¨ ander level, just to name the most
prominent. Further articles with implications for natural haz-
ard risk management are covered by individual articles of
the federal trafﬁc law and the law related to disaster man-
agement. On the L¨ ander level, articles of the laws related
to ﬁre brigades and of the policies for disaster aid include
individual regulations with respect to natural hazards. Sub-
sequently, multiple agreements between the federal state and
the L¨ ander exist, above all regulating ﬁnancial issues with
respect to early warning systems, mutual rights related to
alerts, and several articles on ﬁnancial compensation. Hence,
due to the strong federal character of the Republic of Austria,
legislation and execution of issues arising from dealing with
the effects of mountain hazards are assigned to different fed-
eral, L¨ ander, and local authorities depending on their respec-
tive jurisdiction and competence (Fig. 1). Accordingly, these
authorities get also individually active with respect to the ad-
ministration of the private sector, e.g., concerning aspects of
prevention and loss adjustment.
Despite these multiple responsibilities at different govern-
mental levels, the most important and fundamental laws – the
Austrian Forest Act and the associated decree related to haz-
ard mapping – will be addressed in the following sections.
2.1 Hazard mapping and spatial planning
In Austria, the methodology for delimiting hazard zones is
regulated by a national legal act (Republik ¨ Osterreich, 1975)
and an associated decree (Republik ¨ Osterreich, 1976). The
implementation of these regulations is assigned to the Fed-
eral Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Wa-
ter Management (BMLFUW) and administrated by the gov-
ernmental departments of the Austrian Service for Torrent
andAvalancheControl(WLV)intheupperpartsofthecatch-
ments and the Federal Water Engineering Administration in
the lower parts of the catchments. The Austrian Forest Act
(§8b) of 1975 prescribes the delimitation of hazard zones in
catchment areas susceptible to natural hazards such as tor-
rential ﬂoods or avalanches (Forest Act §99) and areas re-
served for mitigation measures. In §11, the compilation of
hazard maps and the involvement of communes and popula-
tion are regularised. The contents and designs of these maps
are speciﬁed by a decree associated to the Forest Act (Re-
publik ¨ Osterreich, 1976). According to §5(2) of this De-
cree on Hazard Zoning, all available data and information
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Fig. 1. Structure of the planning system related to mountain hazards in Austria (modiﬁed from ¨ OROK, 2005).
on natural hazards as well as interactions between individual
hazard processes have to be considered during the compila-
tion of hazard maps. Furthermore, interferences with the hu-
man environment, such as infrastructure facilities and settle-
mentshavetobetakenintoaccount. Hazardmapsareusually
based on the area of an individual community, and should
be compiled in a reproducible manner to allow for valida-
tion during the approval process by the Federal Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management.
Hazard maps are based on a design event with a return pe-
riod of 1 in 150years, and an event occurring more frequent
with a return period of 1in 10years (Republik ¨ Osterreich,
1976). In §6 of the Decree on Hazard Zoning, the criteria
for delimitation of hazard zones is prescribed. According
to these prescriptions, red hazard zones indicate those areas
wherethepermanentutilisationforsettlementandtrafﬁcpur-
poses is not possible or only possible with extraordinary ef-
forts for mitigation measures. Yellow hazard zones indicate
those are as where a permanent utilisation for settlement and
trafﬁc purposes is impaired by hazard processes. Further-
more, speciﬁc other areas have to be displayed in the haz-
ard map: blue colours mark areas to be provided for future
mitigation measures, above all silvicultural measures, brown
coloursindicateareasaffectedbylandslidesandrockfall, and
purple colours indicate areas that can be used as protection
due to their natural properties, such as protection forests or
natural retention basins.
From a legal point of view, the hazard map does not
bind land use planners directly in their decisions since
the delimitation of hazard zones is not statutory regulation
in accordance with the Austrian Superior Administrative
Court (VwGH 27.03.1995, 91/10/0090, Hattenberger, 2006;
Kanonier, 2006). As a consequence, hazard maps are not
normative acts resulting in certain external effects or actions
but they are classiﬁed as an opinion of experts providing
a forecast for prospective developments of natural hazards
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effects. Accordingly, if the protection against natural hazards
is intended to be fundamental for the decision-making of an
administrative body, any conﬂicts arising between these de-
cisions and the content of hazard maps have to be at least
technically justiﬁed. Approaching this issue differently, ad-
ministrative responsibility will be neglected considerably if
the content of hazard maps is not taken into account accord-
ingly in any governmental action. Hence, hazard maps are
not legally binding for spatial planning purpose unless there
is particular reference in the individual spatial planning law
of the individual L¨ ander, e.g. the Tyrolean Act on Spatial
Planning explicitly addresses the protection of areas suitable
for building activities against the adverse effects of natural
hazards (Amt der Tiroler Landesregierung, 2006 §1 Abs. 2
lit. d). Nevertheless, the content of hazard maps is inter-
nally binding for any administrative body in terms of an or-
der, in particular for the governmental departments of the
Austrian Service for Torrent and Avalanche Control (WLV)
and the Federal Water Engineering Administration (Hatten-
berger, 2006). Furthermore, due to European and interna-
tional law, i.e. the Alpine Convention (CIPRA, 1998) and the
European Flood Risk Directive (Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities, 2007), areas endangered by natural haz-
ards have to be depicted accordingly in order to exclude them
from further development activities.
Regional planning and regional development are a matter
of the Austrian L¨ ander and related legal regulation is within
the individual L¨ ander responsibility. Hence, for the regional
as well as local planning level multiple regulations with re-
spect to land utilisation, land use planning and building de-
velopment exist. Considering areas endangered by natural
hazard processes the traditional way to direct development
activities in areas not exposed is an overall major princi-
ple but also a major task for local administrative bodies re-
sponsible, since areas for development are relatively scarce.
However, as outlined by Kanonier (2006) the principle of
L¨ ander legislation providing higher-order environmental pol-
icy guidelines and establishing mandatory regulations to sup-
portmunicipalitiesforexecutionsonalocallevelisnolonger
traceable in the present spatial planning reality. Although re-
gional planning and the subordinated land development plan
as main administrative tool are statutory, an implementation
on the local level is not necessarily deducible. Because of
the particular interests of stakeholders involved, higher-order
regulations might be solved with respect to individual local
needs differently. Furthermore, recently introduced partici-
pative approaches are gaining increasingly importance in or-
der to provoke cooperation with parties affected. These af-
fected parties regularly experienced restrictions for develop-
ment of existing building land due to deﬁned hazard zones
(as a consequence of updated hazard information), including
prohibition of development within a deﬁned period in time
and within a certain location. Consequently, stakeholders on
the local level might disesteem L¨ ander requirements, which
will be mirrored directly on the local political decision level.
Anadditionalproblemisthedifferenthorizonofspatialplan-
ning activities (5–10years on the local level, 30–50years
on the regional level) and the hazard mapping process (10–
20years). In this regard, the implementation of the Euro-
pean Flood Risk Directive will contribute to a harmonisation
since according to Art. 4, preliminary ﬂood risk maps have
to be compiled until December 2011, and according to Art. 6
the Member Countries are obliged to prepare area-wide ﬂood
risk maps until December 2013. Furthermore, these maps
have to be regularly updated during a six-year interval (Com-
mission of the European Communities, 2007).
Until now, a considerable diversity of interpretation is de-
tectable with respect to the inclusion of natural hazard pre-
vention in the spatial planning process in different L¨ ander
in Austria. Since regulations related to regional planning
and development include – besides the prevention against
the adverse effects of natural hazards – several other aims,
multiple interests in utilisation and possibilities of develop-
ment are confronted with the need to protect settlements and
infrastructure against possible losses resulting from hazard
processes. Hence, a conﬂict of objectives is inevitable. In or-
der to implement a minimum standard of protection against
natural hazards, building regulation is a purposeful tool to
convert prevention into action.
2.2 Building regulation
To implement long-term planning policies and related spatial
planning aims into practice, multiple measures and instru-
ments on different administrative levels are possible. Two
major principles to avoid an increasing risk potential exist,
the avoidance to extend development land into areas affected
by natural hazards, and the prescription of certain building
regulations and structural measures, such as local structural
protection. Thereby, spatial planning activities are not able
to lower existing values exposed in already built-up areas. In
contrast, by limiting re-zoning at local governmental level,
constructional development activities of plots located in en-
dangered areas are adjusted in order to not increase values
at risk exposed considerably. These mandatory restrictions
in development on the local level are part of a hierarchical
multi-stepped system within the regional planning and land
use planning legislation as well as in the building laws at
the L¨ ander level and below in the municipalities (Kanonier,
2006). The regional development plan is therefore an appro-
priate tool to prescribe in a top-down approach certain regu-
lations to individual municipalities on the local level. Hence,
a minimum requirement is the depiction of hazard zones in
these plans, whereas the level of detail varies considerably
between individual L¨ ander in Austria. While in the Federal
State of Vorarlberg areas of certain relevance for the plan-
ning process have only to be visualised, it is mandatory in
the Federal State of Salzburg to identify areas necessary for
ﬂood runoff and ﬂood retention as well as areas indicated
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in hazard maps (Amt der Salzburger Landesregierung, 2004,
Slbg ROG §16 Abs. 2 lit. c; Amt der Vorarlberger Lan-
desregierung, 1996, Vlbg RplG 1996 §12 Abs. 5).
However, the communal administrative opportunity for
judgement might be considerable, above all with respect to
possible exceptions applicable to guarantee the economic de-
velopment of a certain region. The extent of consequences
arising from natural hazard processes is directly inﬂuenced
by the legal execution in the respective community or region.
The historical shift of a traditionally agricultural society to
aserviceindustry-andleisure-orientedsocietyismirroredby
socioeconomic development in mountain environments and
foreland regions. This shift is reﬂected by an increasing use
of those areas for settlement, industry, and recreation. Due
to an increasing concentration of tangible and intangible as-
sets and to an increasing number of persons exposed to nat-
ural processes, there is an emerging need for the considera-
tion of risk in land use development. Long-term analyses of
risk evaluating these changes provided a general idea about
the development of assets in endangered areas. Regarding
the long-term development in values at risk, a signiﬁcant in-
crease could be proven for the period between 1950 and 2000
in the Eastern Alps (Fuchs et al., 2005; Keiler et al., 2006).
This development strengthens the need for due diligence
processesinspatialplanningandlanddevelopment, aboveall
with respect to building regulations to be increasingly imple-
mented in planning processes on the local level. Even if the
consideration of natural hazard processes is already imple-
mented in the planning procedure on different administrative
levels under the responsibility of multiple authorities, there
is a particular need to enact the mandatory authorisation of
planned constructions in areas inﬂuenced by natural hazard
risk. The designation of development land requires the gen-
eral adequacy of the plots for the intended use; consequently,
buildingbansshouldbeenactedforthoseareasthataredueto
their natural conditions not suitable for such purpose. How-
ever, such building bans are rarely implemented in practice
and are often only applicable to red hazard zones (Kanonier,
2006). Moreover, the legally prescription of protection in ar-
eas less endangered by natural processes also seems to be
not very successful in practice. Examples include in partic-
ular situations when the planned constructions intend not to
increase the values at risk considerably, or if the developed
land will not be extended into areas with a signiﬁcantly in-
creasedhazardpotential. Amongothers, correspondingregu-
lationscanbefoundintheFederalStateofUpperAustriaand
in the Federal State of Tyrol (Amt der ober¨ osterreichischen
Landesregierung, 2004 §21 Abs. 1a lit. 2; Amt der Tiroler
Landesregierung, 2006 §37 Abs. 2 lit. b).
As outlined above, the prescription of local structural pro-
tection is a promising principle in order to minimise risk.
Considering different mass movement processes and their
impacts on the built environment, multiple solutions for the
protection of new buildings and the upgrade of existing in-
ventory exist (Holub and H¨ ubl, 2008). Recent studies related
to torrential hazards in Austria (Fuchs et al., 2007a) and
Switzerland (Romang et al., 2003) suggested a considerable
decrease in vulnerability, if local structural protection is im-
plemented. However, until now risk-minimising effects of
local structural measures have only rarely been quantiﬁed so
far (Holub and Fuchs, 2008), presumably since mandatory
legal regulations are almost missing therefore. Only the Fed-
eral State of Vorarlberg explicitly addresses the possibility
to prescribe legal requirements for local structural measures,
if economically reasonable and technically feasible, in the
respective land use planning act (Amt der Vorarlberger Lan-
desregierung, 1996, Vlbg RplG 1996 §13 Abs. 2 lit. a).
2.3 Future needs
Land use planning activities such as hazard maps are based
on the concept of recurrence intervals of hazard processes.
Since the hazard potential and thus the delimitation of haz-
ard zones is subject to temporal changes, the resulting cop-
ing strategies in order to minimise risk have to be variable.
From the point of view of spatial planning dealing with such
changes is of particular difﬁculty since the required stability
of the law restricts short-term modiﬁcations in land use plan-
ning regulations to a minimum. In particular building bans
and re-zoning of already permitted land development activi-
tiesremainanunsolvedtasksinceonceenactedandapproved
by the regulatory authority additional prescriptions or prohi-
bitions could hardly be accomplished. Hence, the overlap be-
tween hazard areas and areas used for settlement purpose and
economic activities increasingly provokes conﬂicts of inter-
est that need to be addressed in natural hazard management.
Nevertheless, due diligence as legal obligation resulting in
usage limitations and prohibitions executed during the indi-
vidual construction process is inevitable, in particular with
respect to the prescription of local structural protection. On-
going inspections by the respective authorities, associated
certiﬁcation and ﬁnal approval of work should be legally pre-
scribed. Furthermore, the increased consideration of hazard
maps already during the constructing permit procedures as
wellasthemandatoryinvolvementoftherespectiveauthority
(Austrian Torrent and Avalanche Control Service) during the
entire process seems promising with respect to create more
disaster-resilient communities.
Apart from the cost-efﬁciency (Holub and Fuchs, 2008),
local structural protection is a serious and promising ap-
proach in mitigating natural hazards with respect to le-
gal requirements in accordance with local planning regula-
tions. This is of particular relevance considering the fact that
building regulations other than local structural measures are
hardly to be implemented ex post. Due to the overall princi-
ple of reliance on legal acts, planning decisions afﬁrmed in
the past have to be persistent over a certain period in time.
With respect to natural hazard management, legal regula-
tions related to land use decisions are accompanied by the
principle of governmental loss compensation in Austria.
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3 Loss compensation in Austria – the disaster fund
As a basic principle, different strategies are applicable as in-
struments to mitigate the effects of natural hazards. Within
the scope of integral risk management, their individual ben-
eﬁts and possible weaknesses have to be balanced against
each other. Hence, mitigation measures can be classiﬁed
according to the idea of integral risk management by their
ability to raise individual awareness and to facilitate the will-
ingness of people affected becoming proactive and invest-
ing private money. In order to achieve this goal, mitigat-
ing natural hazards is pillared by regulatory instruments as
well as other management strategies in dependence on their
applicability as preventive (modiﬁcation of the natural haz-
ard process and/or damage potential) or subsequent reactive
measures (maintenance, see Table 1). With respect to the
latter emphasis is placed on the compensation of resulted
damages, e.g. by shifting the costs for compensation to an
insurance pool or by disbursing public expenditures or gov-
ernmental aids. In Austria, such governmental aids play a
major role in loss compensation since natural hazards are not
subject to compulsory insurance. Apart from the inclusion
of losses resulting from hail, pressure due to snow load, rock
fall and sliding processes in an optional storm damage insur-
ance, no standardised product is currently available on the
national insurance market. Moreover, the terms of business
of this storm damage insurance explicitly exclude coverage
of damage due to avalanches, ﬂoods and inundation, debris
ﬂows, earthquakes and similar extraordinary natural events
(Schieferer, 2006; Weiß, 2008).
3.1 Background
According to the constitution of the Republic of Austria,
losses resulting from natural hazards do not fall under the
national jurisdiction. Thus, any responsibility for potential
aids to repair damage to assets of individuals, companies and
legal entities resulting from natural hazards generally is as-
signed to the L¨ ander (Fuchs et al., 2007b).
Nevertheless, assistance for compensation was required on
the federal level in 1950/51 due to the avalanche disasters
that occurred in large areas of the Austrian Alps. Subse-
quently, the Republic of Austria issued a special law for the
ﬁnancialsupportofandgovernmentalaidforpersonsharmed
by avalanches. Further major hazard events required addi-
tional speciﬁcations of this law until the ﬂoods of 1965/66
necessitated the establishment of a permanent so-called dis-
aster fund.
The Federal Act related to the Disaster Fund of 1966
(Republik ¨ Osterreich, 1966) provided the legal basis for the
provision of national resources for
– preventive actions to construct and maintain torrent and
avalanche control measures, and
– ﬁnancial support for the L¨ ander to enable them to com-
pensate individuals and private enterprises for losses
due to natural hazards in Austria.
To provide ﬁnancing of the disaster fund, tied surcharges
wereputonincometaxes, wagetaxes, taxesoncapitalyields,
and corporate taxes. After being subject to several amend-
ments, the legal act from 1966 was revised by the so-called
Federal Act related to the Disaster Fund of 1996 (Republik
¨ Osterreich, 1996 ). This law is still in force in the prevailing
form. The budget of the disaster fund originates from a de-
ﬁned percentage (since 1996: 1.1%) of the federal share on
the income taxes, taxes on capital yield, and corporate taxes,
which amounts to approximately 7 C for private households
and 30 C for business entities per year (Vetters and Pretten-
thaler, 2004). Financial means which are not spent in a re-
spective year are subject to a reserve. In accordance with
the Austrian Court of Audit, the prescribed maximum re-
serves of the disaster fund is limited to 29million C (Repub-
lik ¨ Osterreich, 1996). This regulation resulted in a redistri-
bution of additional reserves to other budget items in years
with below-average incurrence of losses, which is one of the
major problems of the strain on liquidity of the disaster fund
if above-average losses occur.
Within the Federal Act related to the Disaster Fund of
1996 (Republik ¨ Osterreich, 1996) the allocation of resources
is legally prescribed. A considerable share of the budget has
to be provided for the prevention of damage resulting from
ﬂoods and avalanches, as well as the funding of passive ﬂood
mitigation measures. Further provisions include the survey
of water quality, the funding of early warning devices, and
the subsidising of the crop hail insurance in Austria. The
prevention of ﬂood and avalanche losses not only includes
direct ﬁnancial aids, but also the measurements undertaken
by respective institutions under public law, i.e. the Austrian
Torrent and Avalanche Control Service. Further ﬁnancial re-
sources have to be spent for remedial actions to be under-
taken for losses resulting from natural hazards that occurred
at properties and assets of local public authorities, and the
acquisition of equipment for the locally-based voluntary ﬁre
brigades.
A major budgetary item, also from the point of public
perception, is the regular support of the L¨ ander by the dis-
aster fund in providing subsidies for disaster compensation
to individuals and legal entities affected by natural hazards.
Losses of private households and companies due to natural
hazards are compensated to a certain degree by the disaster
fund. The disaster fund, respectively the Republic of Austria,
subsidises the L¨ ander up to 60% of that ﬁnancial aid that was
paid out by the L¨ ander in order to support parties aggrieved
by natural hazards. By these compensations, affected parties
can receive an average indemnity up to a total of 20–30% of
the overall amount of losses suffered.
The disaster fund also provides ﬁnancial assistance to any
level of government. At the local and L¨ ander, damages to
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infrastructure facilities are subsidised, and on the federal
level damages to waterways and motorways are compensated
by 50% of the overall amount of loss.
Sincethecompetenceofcompensatinglossesthatincurred
due to natural hazards is allocated at the L¨ ander level, the
L¨ ander are not only responsible for assessing damages but
also for the loss payment. In general, after damage has been
recorded by a locally-based expert commission, compensa-
tions are paid out by the respective federal province directly
to the people affected. Thereby, ﬁnancial aids of the L¨ ander
are reduced by the share received as compensation paid out
by optional hazard insurance companies. However, there is
neither any enforceable legal right for ﬁnancial assistance,
nor a certain level of guaranteed ﬁnancial assistance resulting
from the disaster fund act. The Federal Ministry of Finance
administrates the resources of the disaster fund.
3.2 Future needs
Societal and political decisions about mitigation measures
concerning natural hazards are generally based on a multi-
plicity of interests due to the variety of parties involved. One
major characteristic of mitigation measures is that the private
sector does not supply them in a sufﬁciently great enough
quantity given the potential economic beneﬁts to society,
therefore mitigation measures have characteristics of pub-
lic goods or common (pool) resources (Fuchs and McAlpin,
2005). In the theory of public goods it is assumed that indi-
viduals are aware of their preferences. However, consumers
might not always be aware of their preferences for protec-
tion measures, which can be partly attributed to free supply,
passive consumption – and governmental subsidies for dis-
aster compensation to individuals and legal entities affected
by natural hazards. This somehow insufﬁcient starting posi-
tion, tracing back to the non-excludability and non-rivalry in
consumption, requires a centralised coordination of the gov-
ernment. Hence, until now, market failure is the normative
rationale for governmental intervention in order to mitigate
natural hazards, and the provision of protection against nat-
ural hazards is commonly regarded as a governmental duty.
However, direct governmental interventions do not offer any
explicit incentive for individuals to react risk minimising and
voluntarily to a threat, and to subsequently provide preven-
tion measures on an individual basis (which in case of lo-
cal structural protection would be characterised by exclud-
ability and rivalness). Limited public resources and steadily
increasing ﬁnancial losses from natural hazards demand a
more efﬁcient allocation of public expenditures (Raschky
and Weck-Hannemann, 2007), which might be – until now –
solely achievable by raising risk awareness and consequently
encouraging private expenditures in local structural protec-
tion measures.
It is widely accepted that living in areas endangered by
natural hazards belongs to the category of involuntary risks –
even if this is only partly true since citizens and other people
Table 1. Possible preventive and reactive measures to mitigate
natural hazards.
Preventive measures Subsequent/
reactive measures
Administration (e.g., evacuation) Disaster fund
Planning tools (e.g., hazard mapping,
land use planning, building codes) Insurance pools
Technical structures Liability
Forestal-biological measures
(e.g., protection forest)
affected in principle could choose between different alter-
native locations for living and economic activities. Hence,
losses from natural hazards not only can be ascribed to the
geographic location itself (hazards-of-place model of vulner-
ability, Cutter, 1996; Cutter et al., 2003), but are also a result
from individual choices and preferences. Accordingly, vol-
untariness and awareness will become inﬂuencing factors in
the near future with respect to the ongoing discussion on a
possible implementation of a compulsory hazard insurance
system in Austria (Schieferer, 2006; Holub and H¨ ubl, 2008).
If these ideas will become reality, according to the princi-
ple that the party responsible is liable for the damages a cer-
tain contribution will be demanded from those people liv-
ing in endangered areas. From the economic point of view,
and thus from the viewpoint of the disaster fund as a gov-
ernmental constitution, this instrument of liability represents
a solution-orientated and efﬁcient incentive in order to pro-
voke risk-reducing behaviour, and in order to create disaster-
resilient communities.
However, until now, the disaster fund has to be consid-
ered as the only available compulsory nation-wide solution
in Austria, showing the following characteristics:
– Independently from the exposure to natural hazards,
premiums are levied on a legal basis as a certain per-
centage of the federal share on the income taxes, taxes
on capital yield, and corporate taxes.
– These premiums have to be paid by every citizen and
business entity, independently from the individual ex-
posure to certain hazards.
– There is no legal claim to a compensation of losses.
– Due to divergent legal regulations in the L¨ ander, the
conditions of damage compensation are considerably
different within the Republic of Austria, leading to
social injustice if large areas are affected by hazardous
events (e.g., during the 2002 and 2005 ﬂood events).
– Preventive measures are not considered in terms of a
smaller premium rate; in contrast, private precaution in
terms of individually contracted insurances will reduce
the compensation paid out from the disaster fund.
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Fig. 2. Balance of the disaster fund with and without capped budget
(modiﬁed from Prettenthaler and Vetters, 2005).
As laid down in the Federal Act related to the Disaster Fund
of 1996 (Republik ¨ Osterreich, 1996) and outlined above, the
capped resources amount to 29million C per year. Conse-
quently, accumulated resources above this amount are regu-
larly removed from the fund, and alternatively used within
the national budget of Austria. The result of this procedure
is shown in Fig. 2 by the red line, indicating the continuous
annual withdrawal of reserves. The green line, alternatively,
indicates the theoretical development of the accumulated re-
serves if the fund was not ﬁxed upwards by 29million C.
In 2002 and 2003, major compensations were paid out by
the budget of the disaster fund, consequently, additional re-
sources had to be made available by the Republic of Austria
in order to cover the occurring ﬁnancial gap (red line). Al-
ternatively, if the fund was not ﬁxed, the accumulated budget
would have been sufﬁcient to compensate these losses (green
line).
In Fig. 3, the overall expenditures of the disaster fund are
indicated for the period 1991–2003. The budget used for
loss compensation (white bars) is shows considerable ﬂuctu-
ations, while the other expenditures incurred according to the
Federal Act related to the Disaster Fund of 1996 (Republik
¨ Osterreich, 1996) are relatively stable (grey bars). Therefore,
measures of the budgetary risk management are required to
supplement the budgeting of the reserves, arguing for an
independent organisation of the loss adjustment, e.g., by
splitting-off this sector according to the procedure in actuar-
ial business (Prettenthaler et al., 2005) to allow for indepen-
denthedgingtransactions. Sincesofar, risk-aversebehaviour
is not taken into account during loss compensation, a de-
coupled organisation of the loss-compensating share would
allow for the initiation of measures that create consider-
able incentives to implement mitigation measures, i.e., pri-
vately ﬁnanced local structural protection systems. In con-
trast, by the present system, negative incentives for house-
holds and business entities are provided, in particular since
Fig. 3. Disaster Fund: expenses for loss adjustment versus total
expenditures 1991–2003 (modiﬁed from Prettenthaler and Vetters,
2005).
private insurance indemnities are subtracted before govern-
mental compensation is paid out.
Among others, Prettenthaler and Vetters (2005), Schief-
erer (2006), and Weiß (2008) suggested adjustments of
the current system of loss compensation in Austria, which
include
– a splitting of different ﬁnancial sectors of the disaster
fund, i.e. the prevention and loss adjustment into differ-
ent budgetary units, a loss adjustment pool and a pooled
prevention funds;
– an outsourcing of the loss adjustment pool under super-
vision of the Austrian Financial Market Authority in-
cluding the possibility of
– a mandatory coverage extension for property insurers
in Austria by a combined natural hazard package with
basic premiums charged commensurate with the risk in
order to avoid averse selection;
– a ﬁxed distribution of the related premium income
achieved with a share of 30% for the insurer and 70%
for the disaster fund; and accordingly
– a proportionate loss adjustment with a share of 30%
from the insurers’ own funds and 70% from the disaster
fund.
– Insurers only accept risks if these are in line with the
capacity limits they have set. Capacity is the maxi-
mum amount of coverage that could be offered by an
insurer over a given period. Hence, a stop-loss cover-
age by the disaster fund should be introduced if the an-
nual compensations paid out by the insurers exceed the
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sevenfold annual premiums. Thereby, the possibility of
cession should remain unaffected.
By these adjustments of the current system ofloss compensa-
tion, incentives to implement local structural protection can
be set with respect to an efﬁcient risk management facing
future challenges emerging from natural hazards in Austria.
Thereby, a diversiﬁed portfolio balance is essential, which
will only be possible by an adoption of the current national
system of disaster aid to the items outlined above.
4 Risk transfer in Austria
Shifting risk from one party to another is the basic principle
of risk transfer, and a key issue in (economic) risk manage-
ment. Insurance as a form of risk management is primarily
used to hedge against the risk of a contingent loss. Insur-
ance is deﬁned as the equitable transfer of the risk of a loss,
from one entity to another, in exchange for a premium, and
can be thought of a guaranteed small loss to prevent a large
loss. As outlined by Schieferer (2006) and Weiß (2008), in-
surance coverage against losses resulting from natural haz-
ards is available in Austria since the mid-1950s, in particu-
lar with respect to losses occurring due to windstorm (air-
ﬂow with velocities >60km/h), hail, snow load (application
of force due to naturally accumulated static snow packs),
rockfall, and landslides (down slope movement of soil and
rock masses along a subsurface shear plane). It is only since
the mid-1990s that other natural hazard processes may be
included in insurance contracts, namely by individually ex-
tended coverage since in general they are excluded of liabil-
ity (Weiß, 2008).
4.1 Background
Besides the system of the disaster fund outlined in the pre-
vious section, private or business entities may also insure
against the losses incurring from natural hazards with pri-
vate insurance companies. However, until now, private insur-
ance companies only provide policies with very limited cov-
erage for damage arising from natural hazards. According
to the Austrian Underwriting Association, most insurance
companies cover for damages to private buildings and house-
holds up to a sum between 3700 C and 15000 C per contract,
while only few insurers compensate up to 50% of the in-
sured sum (Gruber, 2008). These relatively small contractual
amounts covered are effected without any risk assessment on
the insurers’ side, and therefore do neither mirror commen-
surate premiums nor incentivise individuals to a risk-aware
behaviour with respect to e.g. an private investment in pre-
ventive measures. Business entities are granted more ﬂexi-
ble contract conditions than private households, in particular
since they have access to combined policies (speciﬁcally “all
risk policies”), hence, higher coverage against losses result-
ing from natural hazards is available.
On request, some contractors offer higher coverage based
on appropriate premium rates; therefore, detailed risk assess-
ments are regularly undertaken (Schieferer, 2006). The asso-
ciated extended cover is carried out either up to a ﬁxed max-
imum sum amounting to 20000 C per insurance policy, or
up to 25–50% of the building value. However, even these
policies cannot cover for all types of hazardous events and
obviously exclude extraordinary, i.e. extreme, events.
Since natural hazard insurance is not compulsory in Aus-
tria so far, the main obstacle private insurers have to deal
with is adverse selection, which is the adverse impact on an
insurer when risks are selected that have a higher probabil-
ity of loss than that contemplated by the applicable insur-
ance rate. With respect to natural hazards, adverse selection
occurs since only those persons and business entities being
located in endangered areas tend to contract insurances. In
order to encounter adverse selection, insurance companies
try to reduce exposure to large claims either by limiting cov-
erage or by raising premiums.
Apart from the effect of adverse selection, the market pen-
etration of insurance policies is relatively low due to the
mechanism of loss compensation by the disaster fund. To
beneﬁt from these compensations, people do need neither
to pay written premiums nor do they have to contribute to
the available funds otherwise – a strong incentive for more
risky behaviour. Thus, the issue of third-party intervention,
i.e., governmental funding, turned out to be a crucial aspect
for the Austrian insurance market (e.g., Froot, 2002). Fur-
thermore, and this is presumably the second reason for low
market penetration, in most of the L¨ ander the compensations
paid out by the disaster fund are shortened by (private) insur-
ance compensations. Hence, risk-aware people underwriting
private natural hazard insurances are de facto worse off than
less aware people not taking precaution actions, which leads
again to decreasing demand in natural hazard insurance poli-
cies in Austria.
4.2 Future needs
Mountain hazards are deﬁned from an engineering point of
view as a function of the probability of occurrence of a spe-
ciﬁc scenario and the corresponding losses (Varnes, 1984)
or – more generally and thus including perspectives from
social sciences – the result of human economic activity in
mountain regions (Fuchs et al., 2007b; Raschky, 2008). Fo-
cussing on the latter, both theoretical and empirical research
had shown that the market for risk-transfer tends to work
imperfectly or even fail completely with respect to natu-
ral disasters (Kunreuther and Pauly, 2004). Adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard, occurring when individuals behave
in ways to satisfy themselves, but their behaviour comes at
the detriment of others because they do not bear the full
cost, can only partly explain these market imperfections
(Jaffee and Russell, 2003). Kunreuther (2000) deﬁned sit-
uations of distorted demand and insufﬁcient supply on the
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market for natural hazard insurance as the disaster syndrome:
individuals tend to underinsure because of the underestima-
tion of risk of low-probability high loss events, and the ex-
pected ﬁnancial relief by governmental compensation or pri-
vate donation, the latter being described as charity hazard
by Raschky and Weck-Hannemann (2007). This market fail-
ure led to different forms of government intervention in the
market for disaster insurance (e.g., Ungern-Sternberg, 2004),
i.e., the disaster fund in Austria. In addition to an inefﬁcient
amount of insurance coverage, ﬁnancial assistance from the
government does rarely meet the needs of the disaster vic-
tims and therefore results in an inefﬁcient allocation of pub-
lic resources, a phenomenon that was extensively observed
by Garrett and Sobel (2003) with respect to FEMA disaster
aid in the US.
As outlined above, the current system of governmental in-
tervention in Austria showed some weaknesses that might
be overcome by the introduction of a system of risk trans-
fer pillared by private insurers, reinsurance, and governmen-
tal stop-loss coverage. Therefore, premiums which are com-
mensurate with the risk should be charged for hazard-prone
property in order to overcome the phenomenon of adverse
selection, including the offer of an incentives to invest into
mitigation measures. These mitigation measures should in-
clude local structural protection since it had been shown that
such measures are cost-efﬁcient with respect to the minimi-
sation of losses (e.g., Holub and Fuchs, 2008).
A possible approach of how disaster insurance or moun-
tain hazards could be organised is presented schematically
in Fig. 4. Taking the 1 in 150year event as design event
and according to studies published by Fuchs et al. (2004)
and Keiler (2004), approximately 50% of all buildings in
the Eastern Alps are located outside endangered areas. The
residual number of buildings is located inside the red hazard
zone (5%), the yellow hazard zone (25%) and the directly af-
fected 10-m buffers (each buffer approximately 10%). With
increasing distance to the area affected by the hazardous pro-
cess, the impact in terms of pressure or deposition height is
decreasing. Hence, the property exposed is successively less
susceptible to losses. Consequently, the premium rate to be
levied by the insurance companies could be stepped accord-
ing to such impact reductions based on deﬁned reoccurrence
intervals emerging from design events. The risk premium is
further differentiated according to whether or not local pro-
tection measures had been implemented, which will create
incentives to individuals and business entities to behave risk-
aware. If insurance against natural hazards is not compul-
sory, premiums being charged might be stepped according
to suggestions (1a) and (1b). Assuming an average value of
approximately 300000 C for a building located on a torrent
fan in Austria (Fuchs et al., 2007a), the annual premium rate
within the red hazard zone would amount to 2100 C without
and 1050 C with local structural protection, probably in addi-
tion to a certain excess of a retention applicable for high-risk
areas. In analogy, the annual premium rate within the yellow
hazardzonewouldamountto1050 Cwithoutand480 Cwith
local structural protection. Areas neither located in the red
and yellow hazard zones nor in a directly attached buffer will
be charged with 240 C and 150 C respectively. In addition,
a suggestion for annual premium rates assuming a compul-
sory disaster insurance would result in 150 C per building
affected without local protection (2a), and 60 C considering
individual constructive mitigation measures (2b).
By establishing such a system of graduated premiums
commensurate with the risk, the problem of adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard can be addressed and the loss com-
pensation will become more equitable. To complement this
system, information on hazard and risk at a speciﬁc loca-
tion has to be communicated target-oriented to the stakehold-
ers involved. In analogy to the Energy Performance Certiﬁ-
cate providing home owners, tenants and buyers information
on the energy efﬁciency of their property, a similar certiﬁ-
cateapprovingthemeetingofcertainbuildingcodestandards
could encourage the adoption of cost-effective local mitiga-
tion structures. Such a certiﬁcate could in a subsequent step
be valid as a basic requirement for getting insurance cover
at reduced premium rates or presenting credit redemption
agreements (e.g., Kleindorfer and Kunreuther, 1999). Fur-
thermore, incentives might not only emerge from reduced
premium rates but also from other beneﬁts, e.g., reduced tax
load on expenditures necessary to implement local structural
protection.
5 Awareness-building
As a major part of the territory of Austria is located in
mountain areas above 1000ma.s.l. (approximately 36% of
the territory; 50% of which is situated even higher than
1500ma.s.l.), areas suitable for permanent settlements and
economic activities are limited (Holub and H¨ ubl, 2008). As
a result, land development and building activities are concen-
trated on areas affected by natural hazards: in the mountain-
ous regions of Austria, almost 50% of all buildings are po-
tentially exposed to hazards including ﬂooding, and almost
15% are considered to be at high risk (Fig. 4, Fuchs et al.,
2004; Keiler, 2004).
Apart from land use regulations and risk transfer, infor-
mation is a third pillar in order to create disaster-resilient
communities. Hence, knowledge about the individual and
the collective (cumulative) risk is an essential prerequisite
for an adapted and anticipatory dealing with natural hazards
to promote risk-decreasing behaviour. In order to meet this
goal public attention has to be attracted, in analogy to the
debate on climate change a trigger is often needed there-
fore (Egner, 2007). Generating this public attention creates
the ability to communicate risk in a purposeful and target-
oriented manner to different stakeholders affected. The per-
ception of risk is different between experts and laypersons.
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Fig. 4. Development of risk premiums if property insured is successively less exposed (modiﬁed from a sketch in Swiss Re, 1998, and
adapted to mountain hazards). The percental distribution of property was taken from estimates outlined in Fuchs et al. (2005) and Keiler et
al. (2006).
While some studies argue that considerable differences ex-
ist (e.g., Fischhoff et al., 1982; Lazo et al., 2000), often in
dependence of whether or not affected people live in hazard-
prone areas (Siegrist and Gutscher, 2006), other studies con-
clude that there is little empirical evidence for such a propo-
sition (Rowe and Wright, 2002). Information on risk is an es-
sential step to enhance risk awareness and to create disaster-
resilient communities. Nevertheless, until now only little in-
formation has been available related to the necessary design
and impact of such maps and how they may be most effec-
tively created as tools for risk communication and decision-
making. However, it is undoubted that with respect to hazard
mitigation information on risk is an essential step to enhance
risk awareness and to create disaster-resilient communities.
Hazard and risk maps, in which areas endangered by de-
ﬁned design events are depicted, provide one opportunity to
communicate natural hazard risk and to inform about possi-
blerisk-reducingbehaviour. Littleinformationisavailableso
far related to the necessary design and impact of such maps
in order to serve as a risk communication tool (Serrhini et
al., 2008; Fuchs et al., 2009). Covello et al. (1987) identi-
ﬁed four components of risk communication: the message
source, the message design, the delivery channel, and the tar-
get audience. This model depicts risk communication as lin-
ear, viewed as a means of transmitting technical information
regarding risk from a known, intentional source (the experts)
along designed channels, to speciﬁed recipients (the public
affected). As outlined in Fuchs et al. (2009), experts draft
and devise risk maps and associated documentation, and end-
users (public authorities, people concerned, and laypersons)
receive these maps as ﬁnished products regardless of whether
or not they understand the message included. Hence, a feed-
back loop has to be established reversing the traditional way
of communication, e.g., by a cyclical model which was pro-
posed to integrate visual and cognitive perception by the re-
ceiver (Serrhini et al., 2008). However, there might still re-
main a gap between understanding and persuasion at the re-
ceivers side (Bell and Tobin, 2007), in particular with respect
to the 1 in 150years design event providing the basis for haz-
ard maps in Austria.
Furthermore, hazard maps are not yet fully available for
the entire area of Austria endangered by natural hazards
since a nation-wide coverage is only expected to be imple-
mented with respect to the European Flood Risk Directive
over the next years (Commission of the European Commu-
nities, 2007). Many stakeholders concerned (e.g., home-
owners, insurance companies, banks granting credits, and
decision makers) therefore do not have access to the re-
spective information and thus are not fully aware of haz-
ard and risk maps, and consequently do only take care
of hazards if they do already have experienced losses re-
cently. Related to the communicative purpose that hazard
maps might evoke, an adopted and risk-sensitive behaviour
is therefore limited so far in Austria. Consequently, access
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to alternative information sources is inevitable. One step to-
wards enhanced information might be the web-based nation-
wide available risk zoning tool “HORA” which was devel-
oped by the Austrian Insurance Association in cooperation
with the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environ-
ment and Water Management1, as well as the Swiss pendant
“Aquaprotect”2.
The extent of consequences resulting from natural hazard
events is strongly inﬂuenced by the behaviour of the popula-
tion in endangered areas and by the duties of local authori-
ties with respect to legal implementation. Since the state of
information related to hazard exposure seems to be not suf-
ﬁcient so far in Austria, in particular non-technical mitiga-
tion measures neither are optimally nor efﬁciently adjusted
to the possible consequences of hazardous events, and citi-
zens very often even are not aware of their own exposure.
Moreover, the subjective feeling of safety is strongly related
to the hazard perception and awareness of affected people,
and usually decreases with decreasing information on recent
events. These patterns are overlain by the increasing demand
for zero risk emerging in recent years, accompanied by an
increasingly less willingness to invest private money for the
mitigation of hazardous events, and the search for a culprit in
case of a damaging event associated with losses.
If the increasing demand for a higher degree of protection
is put forward the design and implementation of mitigation
strategies not only has to focus on values currently being at
risk. In addition, possible future system states have to be
considered such as changes in the process behaviour lead-
ing to altered design events or an increase in exposed values
(Keiler et al., 2006; Fuchs and Keiler, 2008). Furthermore,
increasingly more attention has to be paid to possible system
failures, and maintenance of protection structures becomes
progressively more important due to the limited lifetime of
such structures. Particularly with respect to the latter, the cul-
ture of oblivion outlined above appears to be a key element to
the perceived decrease of public natural hazards’ awareness.
Since even structures designed for the 1 in 150years ﬂood
are expected to fail the generation of information on risk or-
ganised as a dialogue-oriented process embedded in a par-
ticipatory framework that allows the constructive and open
engagement and integration of various stakeholders (experts,
decision-makers and well as representatives of the local pop-
ulation) is preferable, including speciﬁc information require-
ments of citizens and relying on local expertise in the risk
assessment process.
Complementary to these needs, particular attention has
to be focused on local structural protection measures that
provide a considerable and effective reduction of vulnera-
bility directly at the endangered objects (Holub and H¨ ubl,
2008). Previous experiences with losses due to natural
1http://gis.lebensministerium.at/eHORA
2http://umweltzustand.admin.ch/ubst.php?reset session\
&initialState=aquaprotect\&lang=de
hazards and corresponding negative emotions expressed by
affected people seem to be motivating for citizens to show
damage mitigation behaviour (Kreibich et al., 2005; Siegrist
and Gutscher, 2006). Contrariwise, a substantial number
of people suffering severe losses due to natural hazards did
not intend to invest private money in mitigation measures.
Hence, experiencing strongly negative emotions seems to be
a necessary but not in all cases sufﬁcient condition for the
implementation of local structural protection.
However, with respect to the effectiveness and efﬁciency,
recent experiences with local structural protection suggested
a considerable decrease in vulnerability (Fuchs et al., 2007a;
Holub and Fuchs, 2008), hence they are an indispensable el-
ement of the natural hazard management. This is also mir-
rored by the current Austrian legal situation, according to the
stipulated self-responsibility of citizens affected parties have
to primarily compensate their losses themselves. Only in
legally speciﬁed exceptions, these losses can be transferred
to third parties.
To conclude, the vulnerability of buildings can be reduced
signiﬁcantly by local structural protection measures. There-
fore, people have to be motivated to take preventive actions.
An important prerequisite for implementing local structural
protection is the conviction to be able to minimise personal
risk and losses effectively by these measures. Hence, people
must be aware of their risks, which is related to information,
communication and good governance.
In order to achieve these goals, several strategies are con-
ceivable to encourage the implementation of local structural
protection by raising the risk awareness and personal respon-
sibility of affected citizens:
1. By regularly and continuous information, coping capac-
ities of people affected can be enhanced and thus, the
personal responsibility and sensitisation towards natural
hazards, risk and mitigation measures can be increased.
2. Specialised consulting for people affected with respect
to prevention and local structural protection, including
information about construction and maintenance costs
of local structural measures, as well as the average
height of reconstruction costs resulting from natural
hazard damages in private households. Furthermore,
thesecostsshouldberelatedtocommonlossadjustment
and compensations paid out from insurers and the Aus-
trian disaster fund.
3. Specialised consulting for homeowners, land use plan-
ners, and architects with respect to possibilities of pre-
vention and local structural protection.
4. Specialised information and consulting following natu-
ral hazard events with respect to resistant construction
design and materials.
Following these suggestions, the potential of preventive mea-
sures – currently mostly unused – which partly result from
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a lack of information and subsequently underdeveloped risk
awareness, could be increased. This would consequently re-
sult in a decrease of losses due to natural hazards and public
expenditures for loss adjustment.
6 Conclusions
Creating disaster-resilient communities is pillared by land
use regulations, risk transfer, and information. In the pre-
vious sections, the legal framework of spatial planning has
been discussed. It has been addressed that due to climate
change processes, the hazard potential is subject to tempo-
ral changes, which are not yet fully acknowledged by the
current spatial planning legislation in Austria due to the rel-
atively long time interval of spatial planning activities. Fur-
thermore, modiﬁcations in land use regulations are restricted
to a minimum to ensure the required stability of the law. By
exploiting all options already provided by the legislation on
different administrative levels, due diligence as an obliga-
tion resulting in limitations of utilisation and culminating in
prohibitions executed should be enforced. Thereby, land use
regulations should include the prescription of local structural
protection in order to create more disaster-resilient commu-
nities.
Disaster resilience is directly connected to risk transfer
mechanisms. However, these risk transfer options should be
based on economic incentives of risk-minimising behaviour.
Hence, the current system of governmental aids due to the
disaster fund act should be adjusted, and supplemented by
a system of (mandatory) extension for property insurers in
Austria by a natural hazard package. This insurance should
be based on basic premiums charged commensurate with the
risk in order to avoid adverse selection. Furthermore, indi-
vidual precaution measures undertaken, such as the imple-
mentation of local structural protection, should result in a
general insurability of buildings if natural hazard insurance
is not organised compulsory, or in a considerable reduction
of premiums (independently from whether or not this is in
line with insurers’ business principles).
To complement such incentives information on hazard and
risk for a speciﬁc location has to be delivered target-oriented
to any stakeholder involved. The consequences resulting
from mountain hazards are strongly related to the behaviour
of the population in endangered areas, and the behaviour is
closely connected to the amount of information accessible.
Apart from making use of innovative communication chan-
nels and adopted information strategies, the overall policy to
inform people due to good governance principles has to be
strengthened.
Mitigating mountain hazards is based on the need for a
sound, precautionary and sustainable dealing with natural
hazard phenomena, taking into consideration both, the
processes and the values at risk. In order to minimise losses,
different preventive measures exist that can be classiﬁed
in permanent and temporal measures on the one hand,
and structural measures as well as organisational measures
(i.e., a governmental framework of spatial planning and
appropriate legislation) on the other hand. These different
measures ideally complement each other, whereby a focus
on structural measures in the starting zones of hazard
processes and land use planning activities in the run-out
zones is detectable. With respect to the idea of integral
risk management, the interaction between prevention and
precaution has to be highlighted, and respective incentives
for loss-reducing actions on the local level should be pro-
vided in order to reduce the vulnerability to natural hazards
in Austria (Fuchs et al., 2007a; Fuchs, 2009). However,
until now the performance of local structural measures
often is neglected or even ignored following the axiom
that such solutions cannot be effective. Local structural
measures can be classiﬁed in various ways, i.e., according
to the applicability for protection against the hazard process,
the location with respect to the protected object, as well
as the type of construction and material used; a further
differentiation is possible whether the local structure is of
permanent or temporary use (Holub and H¨ ubl, 2008). The
interaction between the legal framework, the possibilities of
risk transfer, and raising awareness is essential for efﬁcient
disaster risk reduction and contributes to the concept of
resilience as part of proactive adaptation. Coping strategies
have to be adjusted to these premises, and in particular
the implementation of local protection measures has to be
strengthened legally, institutionally, and economically.
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